Eden Network - a Harberger taxed slot system to counter MEV
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- Protect users from malicious MEV (frontrunning, sandwich attacks, etc.) and reduce the negative externalities MEV has on Ethereum
- Improve earnings for block producers and increase consensus-level security against block reorganization
- Tokenize access to MEV, and redistribute value to network stakeholders
How? Per EIP-1559:
Block producers are also allowed to accept transaction bundles. Bundles are be included after any priority queue transactions, but before transactions from regular Ethereum/Eden users.
Miners that participate in the Eden network and receive rewards for prioritising Eden transactions above all other transactions.
There are a set number (3) of “slots”, each with a unique index (i.e. slot 0, slot 1, etc.) that indicates their position within blocks
i. At any time, each slot is owned by exactly one account (the “slot tenant”), who has the right to set a “delegate address” for that slot.
ii. Transactions to (Ethereum transaction field to) the delegate address will be included in the slot
iii. The delegate address may be either an EOA (a regular account) or a smart contract
iv. Transactions submitted directly to the Eden Network relay that revert (fail) have the option of not being included in the block, saving the sender gas fees
Users reserve these slots via a continuous auction mechanism known as a Harberger tax
i. Slot tenants are taxed on a linear basis at some tax rate (3.3%
) per day on the initial principal of their stake. The taxed amount is burned, and the tenant loses their claim on the slot once their entire balance is depleted (301 days as per proposed tax rate)
ii. Any user may become a slot tenant by staking a minimum of 110%1
the EDEN staked by the existing slot tenant at the time the existing slot tenant bid for their slot
iii. In the event that another user outbids the current slot tenant, the original slot tenant is immediately eligible to claim any untaxed balance they have in the smart contract (or increase their stake to reclaim the slot). Being outbid is the only mechanism to recover an untaxed balance
iv. Once a slot tenant is outbid, they simply lose the slot instead of being pushed to the following slot
Block Producer Reward Procedure
For a given block producer that participated in Eden Network honestly over the course of an epoch, that block producer is “owed” some EDEN reward according to the emission schedule in proportion to their contribution to all produced Eden blocks. The exact calculation of owed balances is performed in a decentralized manner by a subgraph on The Graph.
To remit payments, an admin address generates a Merkle tree of these balances and posts the root of the tree to a distributor contract. Each new distribution mints a non-transferable ERC-721 NFT owned by the distributor contract whose metadata is an IPFS URI to the full set of Merkle proofs. Any block producer (or their delegated claimer account) can present the Merkle proof for their address to the distributor to claim their rewards.
Since the Harberger tax implementation creates perpetual deflationary pressure on the circulating supply of EDEN, and the network mints new tokens at an exponentially decreasing rate, we can counteract the implied scarcity through a net emissions mechanism. In a future release of the
protocol, the network will mint additional tokens equal to the minimum tokens burnt in a given day or 66,000 tokens as part of a net issuance mechanism.
Monthly inflation is distributed as follows:
- Block producers: 60%
- Liquidity Providers: 30%
- EDEN Treasury: 10%